The UK has adopted the Marrakesh Compact and agreed to implement the objectives which it sets out (see paragraph 41 of the Marrakesh Compact). The UK Government has repeatedly claimed that national policy is not in conflict with the Marrakesh Compact. Alistair Burt’s, Minister for the Middle East, written statement to Parliament on 10 December 2018 acknowledges that the UK is bound by existing human rights obligations, that these rights are owed specifically to migrants and that UK polices are in line with them. More recently, the UK’s 2020 report to the European Regional Review of the Marrakesh Compact, outlined that ‘the GCM is fully integrated into the UK policy architecture… GCM principles are reflected in wider UK migration policy and maintains senior official/ministerial focus on the GCM.’ The UK government consistently claims that UK policy is in line with the obligations in the Marrakesh Compact and that these are in accordance with international legal obligations owed to migrants. (more…)
By Dr Katie Cruz, Lecturer in Law (University of Bristol Law School).*
On 2nd June, sex workers and activists gathered globally to mark the struggle for sex workers’ rights. International Sex Workers Day is just one day of the year dedicated to the struggle for sex workers. Activists gather on March 3rd to mark International Sex Worker Rights Day and on December 17th to mark International Day to End Violence against Sex Workers. These dates occur because of the historical and ongoing violence against, and exclusion of, sex workers. Sex workers are subject to interpersonal forms of violence, from police officers and clients, and the structural violence of criminal justice and immigration institutions. They are criminalized and affected by often-punitive anti-trafficking laws and policies, and they are subject to heightened immigration controls, including the criminalization of movement and working. The Tory government’s hostile environment has created additional layers of institutionalised insecurity for many migrant sex workers, including restrictions on access to housing, healthcare, education, and banking services.
On 16 November 2016, three days after the terror attacks in Paris, the then-French President François Holland gathered both houses of Parliament (the National Assembly and the Senate) in Versailles. He started his speech with a grave tone, by noting that “France was at war”, and that the country needed to be “ruthless” in “such times of exceptional gravity”. He called for “national unity” and proposed a revision of the Constitution.
His proposal was to enshrine in the Constitution the procedure of the state of emergency (article 1) and the cancellation of citizenship for dual nationality holders (article 2). As Holland then put it
We must be able to strip the nationality of an individual who has been condemned for acts contrary to the fundamental interests of the Nation or acts of terrorism, even if the individual was born French, and I mean it “even if the individual was born French” so long as the person has another nationality (Holland’s speech, 5).
The proposal was eventually dropped on March 2016, following the failure of both houses to agree on a similar text on article 2, cancellation of citizenship, as required by article 89 of the Constitution. This article spread intense debate across French society and enjoyed widespread press coverage from French newspapers of all kinds. More than ten public opinion polls were issued on the subject and it prompted the resignation of Christiane Taubira, the Secretary of State for Justice. All this for a relatively short debate: 136 days in total.
It is unclear whether this failure can be attributed to the specific political context at the time (a right-wing Senate and left-wing National Assembly, the low popularity of President Holland and the uncertainty of the regional elections (which were to take place in June 2016), to the rigidity of the French Constitution (article 89 requires a majority of 3/5 of both houses gathered together in Congress), or to the importance of citizenship-nationality in the French national narrative. Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between these lines. But in the broader context of an increase in recourse by states to the deprivation of nationality as a counter-terror measure (see for example the Netherlands or the UK), a closer analysis of the debate around the contested measure is warranted. (more…)
By Prof Christopher Bertram, Professor in Social and Political Philosophy (University of Bristol School of Arts) & Co-Director of the Bristol Institute for Migration and Mobility Studies; Dr Devyani Prabhat, Lecturer in Law (University of Bristol Law School) and Dr Helena Wray, Associate Professor (University of Exeter Law School).
For thousands of British citizens and residents separated from loved ones by the onerous financial requirements in the immigration rules, the headlines after the Supreme Court decision on 22nd February 2017 in the case of MM v SSHD were disappointing.
The case concerned the entry criteria for a non-EEA national to join their British citizen (or long term resident) spouse or partner (“the sponsor”) in the United Kingdom. These include a requirement that the sponsor has an income of at least £18,600 per annum or substantial savings, with additional sums needed for dependent non-citizen children (“the minimum income requirement” or MIR).
As the press reported, the Supreme Court did not find the MIR incompatible with article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to respect for private and family life) and therefore unlawful. However, hidden behind the government’s reported “victory” is a more complex legal and political picture which offers hope to at least some of those affected. (more…)
By Dr Katie Bales, Lecturer in Law (University of Bristol Law School).*
In July 2016 the Byron hamburger chain colluded with Home Office officials in setting up immigration raids on their workforce which resulted in the arrest and detention of 35 of their workers. Following mass protests over their actions, Byron released a statement declaring that the firm ‘was unaware that any of our workers were in possession of counterfeit documentation’. Despite the fact that ‘vigorous right to work checks were carried out’, Byron claimed that ‘sophisticated counterfeit documentation was used’ by the workers meaning Byron had no idea that those individuals were without the right to work. Byron also claimed that they were under a ‘legal obligation’ to cooperate with the Home Office, suggesting that cooperation with Immigration enforcement was mandatory as opposed to voluntary.
A recent report from Corporate Watch indicates that this type of collusion is not uncommon as immigration enforcement officials often use financial sanctions as a threat to coerce employers into helping with their investigative and arrest operations. The financial sanction referred to exists in the form of a ‘civil penalty’ which stands at £20,000 per worker that is found to be working ‘illegally’ without the right to work. Discounts are made however where employers cooperate with the Home Office. A £5,000 discount will be made for example, where employers report workers and a further £5,000 for active cooperation, a full list of these discounts can be found in the Home Office code of practice on the civil penalty scheme for workers.
The questions raised by the Byron press release and the further report from Corporate Watch concern the extent of the legal obligations placed upon employers in terms of immigration enforcement. Are employers legally obliged to set up ‘arrest by appointment’ meetings for staff for example? And do any of the legal obligations owed to employees or workers conflict with those related to immigration enforcement? (more…)