Tag Archives: reasonable person

Will Judicial Deference to Medical Opinion Undermine the Patient-Focused Standard of Informed Consent to Medical Treatment?

By Mrs Louise Austin, Associate Teacher in Medical Law and PhD Candidate in Law (1+3 ESRC) (University of Bristol Law School).

© Rookuzz..

Following the UK Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, which moved away from a model of medical paternalism and established a model of patient autonomy for informed consent to medical treatment, the High Court has recently had the opportunity to apply the new test in Grimstone v Epsom and St Helier University Hospitals NHS Trust. This blog post provides a summary of my case commentary in the Medical Law Review exploring this decision and its implications, which is now available as ‘Grimstone v Epsom and St Helier University Hospitals NHS Trust: (It’s Not) Hip To Be Square’. Continue reading

Contractual interpretation: from the Tudors to Lord Hoffmann

By Ms Joanna McCunn, Lecturer in Law (University of Bristol Law School).

© Folger Shakespeare Library

Contractual interpretation continues to be a controversial topic. In a recent speech, Lord Sumption attacked Lord Hoffmann’s judgment in Investors Compensation Scheme [1998] 1 WLR 896, still the leading case in the area. For Lord Hoffmann, the key question was what a reasonable person would understand the parties to have intended by their contract, even if this was something different to the ordinary meaning of the words they had used. Lord Sumption, however, argued that the courts must give primacy to the meaning of the words.

It is sometimes suggested that Lord Hoffmann’s approach is an aberration in the common law of contract, which has consistently prioritised the meaning of the words over the parties’ apparent intentions. In fact, however, it bears a striking resemblance to the approach taken by the courts in sixteenth century England, where a very similar debate about interpretation was playing out. In a recently-published book chapter*, I explore this history and what it means for contract lawyers today. Continue reading