The news that the appeal will be heard by a full panel of 11 Justices of the Supreme Court confirms that the High Court’s ‘Brexit Judgment’ is of the highest constitutional significance. So the attention devoted to the judgment by eminent constitutional lawyers is hardly surprising. One powerful argument against the judgment, which is attracting a growing number of supporters, is made by Professor John Finnis in papers for the Judicial Power Project.
Finnis argues that the court mistakenly assumes that EU rights are ‘statutory rights enacted by Parliament’. On his view, the European Communities Act 1972 simply provides a means for making EU law rights enforceable in English law; they are not ‘statutory rights’ as such. Finnis draws an analogy with double-tax treaties. These serve to relieve individuals with connections to more than one country from being taxed twice on the same income. In order for this to apply, both state parties must maintain the international agreement. If one of them gives notice to rescind, as they are typically entitled to do under the treaty, the immunity lapses. In dualist systems such as the UK, there is thus an asymmetry between the creation and removal of rights. There are two conditions precedent for the enjoyment of any new right: an international treaty conferring that right, and an Act of Parliament giving effect to that treaty in domestic law. Both elements are needed to create the right, but if either condition precedent fails, so does the right. The mere fact that Parliament has to provide the domestic conduit does not stop the Government from turning off the international tap.
I am not convinced that this argument works in the context of the UK-EU relationship. (more…)
By Dr Eirik Bjorge, Senior Lecturer in Public International Law (University of Bristol Law School).
According to a carefully argued contribution by Professor Finnis in the Miller debate, rights under the European Communities Act 1972 ‘are not “statutory rights enacted by Parliament”’; they are only ‘rights under the treaty law we call EU law, as it stands “from time to time”’. Finnis thus purports to have broken the chain of the claimant’s main argument.
In that connection, Finnis considers the somewhat recherché example of taxation treaties and the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 to be a useful analogy. The point of the present contribution is to suggest that a more natural analogy would be the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Like the ECA 1972, the HRA 1998 conditions the legal relationship between citizen and state in an overarching manner and deals with fundamental constitutional rights. There is also particularly instructive judicial authority on the HRA 1998 specifically on question of the nature of its relationship with the international treaty whose obligations it mirrors. (more…)
By Dr Luke Butler, Lecturer in Law (University of Bristol Law School).
Since privatisation, passenger rail has fallen victim to a complex web of institutional and contractual relations, a matrix of network owners, service providers, regulators and oversight bodies with ever-changing remits. At the risk of oversimplification, rail provision involves the formal separation of Network Rail’s management of the infrastructure (the track etc) from the operation by Train Operating Companies (“TOCs”) of rail services on that infrastructure. The Department for Transport (“DfT”) opens the operation of rail services up to competition through a procurement process and invites qualified TOCs to bid, although some rail franchises may be directly awarded without competition. In turn, TOCs pay to access the network and lease rolling stock. All involve multiple contracts sharing subsidies, premiums and risks.
Post-privatisation, it was predicated that the contractualisation of rail would lead to “government by lawyers”. Yet, I have always been surprised at the relatively limited engagement of legal research on UK rail since. This blog seeks to renew conversation by arguing that there is a high degree of legal and practical uncertainty in the route to effective franchise procurement and which has not been significantly improved by recent reforms.(more…)
By Prof Dave Cowan, Professor of Law and Policy (University of Bristol Law School)*
Applicants for homelessness assistance who are aggrieved by a local authority’s discretionary decision against their interests, can request a review of that decision. These reviews are an incredibly important part of the homelessness decision-making process – a negative decision made by a local authority can leave an applicant with what one Judge has described as the “mark of Cain”. An applicant who does not seek a review cannot appeal a negative decision; if the applicant does appeal their decision, but fails to make all the relevant points, judicial guidance is that such matters cannot be raised on a subsequent appeal. So, both substance and procedure are in play at this crucial stage of internal review.
Since the early 1990s, myself and my colleagues Caroline Hunter and Simon Halliday, (both currently at York Law School) have conducted research in to homelessness internal reviews—on which we published The Appeal of Internal Review. Law, Administrative Justice and the (non-) Emergence of Disputes (Hart 2003) and ‘Adjudicating the implementation of homelessness law: The promise of socio-legal studies’ (2006) 21(3) Housing studies 381. Our research has been both qualitative and quantitative. (more…)