by Sahar Shah, University of Bristol Law School and Joy Reyes, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
Mitigating climate change is one thing; climate justice is another – however, the two concepts are often conflated in political and media discourses. This is a problem because the two issues require distinct analyses and responses. Without clarity about the nature of, and reasons for, these distinctions, the injustices that stem from climate change risk being subsumed under broadly defined ‘climate mitigation’ efforts. Legal language provides an apt toolkit for clarifying the ‘justice-based’ issues at stake in relation to climate change – and for translating these issues from the theoretical realm into public and policy spheres. The concept of ‘climate reparations’ serves as a topical case in point.
The Western scientific interpretation of climate change can tell us plenty of useful things about the phenomenon: Reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change tell us, with a fair degree of certainty, that the planet is warming and that this places us in various types of peril. These reports explain (again, with a fair degree of certainty) the complex and varied causes of climate change (most of which, notwithstanding their complexity, can be traced to the intensive expenditure of natural resources and energy by industrialised societies). They tell us that the environmental effects of climate change will be more dramatic in certain parts of the world. Science can help answer questions such as: what is climate change and how bad will its effects be?
However, there are thornier, more socially awkward questions to answer about climate change: whose fault is it? Who should pay for mitigating its effects? Does climate change constitute a form of wrong enacted by some individuals against others? Scientific analyses can help support arguments in response to these questions. However, these do not provide us with the conceptual tools we need to meaningfully grapple with these. This post argues that legal concepts and language offer an apt toolkit for clarifying the ‘justice-based’ issues at stake in relation to climate change. The concept of ‘climate reparations’, which invokes a legalistic term (reparations) serves as a topical case in point. This post incorporates insights from a workshop held at the University of Bristol, supported in April 2025 on “Legal Perspectives on Climate Reparations”.
What are climate reparations?
Calls for climate reparations have a long been a central rallying cry amongst climate activists and civil society groups (particularly those based in or representing the Global South) and encompasses a range of demands for epistemic, political, economic, and material transformation. As a starting point, we can look to the working statement formulated by the Global Climate Reparations Movement Governance Assembly, distilled from hundreds of definitions articulated by activists and scholars in this space:
Climate reparations is the restoration of healthy and balanced relationships with all that comprise a shared global ecosystem. Reparative action begins with those who benefit most from the historic and current systems of oppression. It requires the abolition of debt, restitution for injustice and the establishment of accountable systems rooted in Black and Indigenous liberation for all oppressed people and future generations.
This understanding of the term ‘reparations’ clarifies the ‘justice’ dimension of climate justice in a way that prevents this issue from being conflated with climate mitigation efforts more broadly. The abolition of debt, for instance, is a distinctly political and legal matter that demands discourse on these terms – no ‘green technology’ can resolve this issue. It is perhaps for this reason that the term ‘reparations’ is contentious for Global North and other high emitting countries. It is precisely this contentiousness, we argue, that is indicative of the term’s importance and power – particularly if the legal potential of the term is probed.
Why is the term ‘climate reparations’ important?
“It’s just not productive getting into terms like ‘reparations’, you get lawyers involved,” former Irish president and climate activist Mary Robinson said in 2022. “But if we talk about justice, we can get somewhere”. The term reparations seems to – somehow – make climate justice about law and legal issues. What, precisely, is the problem with this?
We suggest that the action potential of ‘reparations language’ within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) frameworks is to re-frame climate finance as ‘normative obligations for historical polluters to pay compensation’ – a framing that Global North countries have, as Dehm explains, ‘persistently evaded’.
This would mark a departure from the primary ways in which climate finance is broadly framed and understood: as a form of ‘charity’ to be transferred from developed to developing countries or as a form of opportunity for long-term returns through private financial investment. As many have argued, both of these understandings of climate finance have value in the face of the urgencies of climate change impacts. Nevertheless, the sidelining of the ‘compensation’ dimension of the issue cannot be justified beyond the fact of the political unwillingness of rich countries to engage. This might be a good reason for climate negotiators and civil society representatives to avoid the term in certain contexts – however, it is very much within the remit legal researchers and actors in this space to address this question meaningfully.
Furthermore, though it might seem politically impossible for historical emitters to accept a fair share of ethical culpability for the climate crisis, the history of the UNFCCC belies this. The preamble to the 1992 UNFCCC explicitly notes:
that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs.The principle of ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibility’ (CBDR) that emerges from this enshrines the essential justice-based formulation that those most culpable for the climate crisis should shoulder the responsibility of addressing it. This does not capture the full extent of virtually any conceptualisations of ‘climate reparations’. However, this essential kernel of justice constitutes a critical shared presumption amongst reparations proponents and, in 1992, much of the world.
However, we have seen a disintegration of this consensus (Vicente Paolo Yu of the Third World Network refers to this as the ‘Grand Bargain’). By the time countries got to the 2015 Paris Agreement (itself a remarkable feat of negotiation and political engineering, headed by Christiana Figueres), the justice-based language has shifted in tone. The Preamble of the Agreement states that the negotiated text is guided by the UNFCCC’s principles, “including the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances”. However, the specific moral and material responsibility (in terms of culpability) of developed countries is sidelined in favour of a focus on the specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties”. This tonal shift paves the way for a framing of climate finance in terms of charity rather than legal and/or moral obligation based on culpability. Thus, Article 8 on loss and damage (the very inclusion of which constituted a hard-won victory for developing countries) is based upon the premise of Parties’ broad recognition of “the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage. and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change”.
There is an observable shift from a focus on equity to a generalised sense of shared obligation to mitigate the physical instantiations of climate change – which might sometimes be differentiated on the basis of the unique needs of developed countries.
The texts of the Paris Agreement’s Articles 8 and 9 on loss and damage and climate finance, respectively, reflect the Global North’s staunch opposition to any phrasing that might imply legal liability for damages caused by climate change or mandatory compensation to affected parties. The text adopting the Paris Agreement states in no uncertain terms that “Article 8 of the Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation”. A climate negotiator from the Global South noted to the authors that Global North countries come to Conferences of the Parties (COP) with teams of negotiators equipped to do battle over every word of every line in the agreements that come to be the world’s most public-facing expressions of ambition on climate action. Despite the best efforts of many parties, the legal and justice-oriented power of these texts is circumscribed by the lowest common denominator of what rich countries – that carry the lion’s share of historical responsibility for climate change – are willing to concede in this space.
This has material effects: the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), which was COP29’s attempt to succeed the unmet $100 billion annual commitment originally pledged by developed countries, still lacks clarity on sources of finance, scope of coverage, and enforceability of pledges. Similar to the Paris negotiations, the discussions that led to the determination of the details (‘quality’) and amount (‘quantum’) of this goal were shaped disproportionately by developed countries, often resisting language that would strengthen obligations or reflect historical emissions. The ‘and not billions, with projections ranging from $1.1 trillion to $5 trillion. Dismay over the NCQG results have led many Global South and climate activists to claim that “no deal was better than a bad deal”.
Why legal perspectives on climate reparations?
It is precisely this fact – that reparations is such a frightening term for historically responsible entities – that suggests that it might have exceptional rhetorical power to transcend political obfuscation of critical justice issues in global climate discourses. Probing the logic of climate reparations from various legal perspectives can serve multiple purposes:
- It can contribute to the conceptualising of climate reparations. The intellectual world of climate reparations is vast and plural – legal perspectives on justice and repair are also complex and varied. Conceptualising climate reparations within various legal disciplines can add new (or amplify existing) understandings of climate reparations to mainstream discourses. No legal pathway or narrative will constitute the ‘solution’ to climate reparations – rather, legal concepts and routes can be (carefully) situated within the Crucially, legal language can mediate between more abstract notions of justice and concrete texts and policy documents. Legal language and argumentation allows us to insist upon the use of ‘tricky’ words/concepts that are sidelined within the current multilateral climate regime. Key words invoked by participants in defining climate reparations in our April workshop included: payment, compensation, liability, historical/past, harm/wrong, breach [of agreement/duty of care/customary norm or obligation], unjust enrichment. These terms concretise and synthesise complex issues and ideas – some nuance is perhaps lost in this process, but real action is made possible.
- The conceptualisation of climate reparations through the lens of various legal disciplines can highlight further avenues for the material realisation of climate reparations – for instance, we might consider the ways in which arguments for climate reparations might be articulated within tax frameworks, tort law, criminal law, or global health law and policy. There is an increasing amount of excellent research on this issue in the sphere of international law. In parallel, the forthcoming ICJ AO represents a potentially significant moment: several Global South countries have already invoked reparations language in their submissions, opening the door to a clearer articulation of climate-related obligations under international law. This is in addition to the fact that submissions from other countries – particularly small island states like Vanuatu – have asserted that certain states are already in breach of their international climate obligations and that legal consequences already exist for this breach. This is perhaps indicative of a resurgence of (and sharp need for) concretely justice-based narratives in climate policy. These lines of enquiry can and should be extended to other fields of law and legal theory.
- Highlighting legal perspectives on climate reparations can serve as a mode of public climate communication. Articulating conceptions of justice/repair from the perspective of various legal disciplines might offer the ‘unconverted’ public (i.e. those not in favour of reparations or think it is an unviable way forward) a bridge to understanding the moral and justice-based issues at play within the climate crisis. Legal analyses of climate frameworks can bring substance and heft to the concept of ‘climate justice’ into mainstream discourses surrounding dominant global climate texts/frameworks. Crucially, the words used by state parties noted in point 1 (above) stand in marked contrast to the implications of the language of texts like Article 8 and 9 that the provision of resources from Global North to Global South countries in the climate crisis is a matter of charity (several participants specifically noted that the notions of ‘responsibility’ and ‘liability’ were diametrically opposed to the concept of ‘charity’). Relatedly, the use of terms such as ‘breach’, ‘harm’, and ‘wrong’ (especially collocated with ‘historical’ and ‘past’) can help clarify the moral/justice-based issue of climate change in an accessible way. As a respected Tort Law Professor (Ken Oliphant) participating in the workshop noted: climate change itself does not constitute a legal wrong, but the damages caused by climate change are a product of legal wrongs. This simple clarification offers a powerful means of shifting a particular discussion/critique from a techno-scientific understanding of the phenomenon of climate change to a moral understanding of the issue (and thus, its resolution).
As we look ahead, legal perspectives on climate reparations may also intersect with – and help to strategically influence – existing institutional processes. Within the UNFCCC regime, discussions around Articles 8 and 9 (mentioned above), the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance, and the operationalisation of the Fund Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) remain sites of ongoing contestation. Even the complexities of the negotiations reveal the different layers of equity and justice discourse. . On another level, it also highlights the differing needs of different countries, and the divergent perspectives based on vulnerability, capacity, and geopolitical influence. Least Developed Countries (LDCs), for instance, often call for urgent, grant-based support to address existential threats, emerging economies on the other hand may prioritise development space and flexibility in their obligations. These show that the negotiations are not neutral, bureaucratic spaces. They are active areas of contestation where competing moral claims and political interests over what is “just” in the climate context are continuously asserted, negotiated, and resisted.
While these mechanisms often fall short of explicitly acknowledging historical responsibility or legal liability, they nonetheless provide avenues where reparative claims could gain traction—particularly if reframed through legal argumentation. For example, reparations language can support calls within the NCQG process for finance that is predictable, grant-based, and public, rather than discretionary or private-sector led, positioning it as a matter of owed justice rather than aid. Similarly, in the operationalisation of the Loss and Damage Fund, legal framing can strengthen arguments for governance structures that prioritise the voices of affected countries and ensure funding is delivered without increasing debt burdens. These framings do not guarantee structural change, but they can shift the normative terrain and create political space for more ambitious, justice-oriented outcomes.
The reparations ‘moment’
The reparations ‘moment’
We are in the midst of a reparations ‘moment’. The African Union declared as its theme for 2025 ‘Justice for Africans and People of African Descent Through Reparations’. Caricom leaders have strengthened official calls for reparations for the transatlantic slave trade from Europe in the past year. There have been at least three conferences devoted to the issue of climate reparations specifically in April/May of this year (including the workshop that forms the basis of this series of blog posts). A number of civil society organisations and NGOs representing Global South/subaltern people have developed and published statements in support of climate reparations in 2024-2025. In the academic sphere, a number of pieces have been published on the issue in 2025 alone.
In the legal sphere, a wave of Advisory Opinions have been requested of various courts (including the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights) to clarify the climate-related obligation of states under international law. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Advisory Opinion was delivered on July 3rd, and is so hot off the press that the full-text English version of the Opinion is not yet available (at the time of writing this post). Perhaps of particular note in this arena is the pending Advisory Opinion (AO) of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), due to be issued this year (2025) – the written submissions of several Global South countries invoked the issue of climate reparations.
While the concept of climate reparations has a long history in climate activist spaces, we might now be witnessing a point of convergence where the issue is being foregrounded simultaneously in many spheres. Perhaps this indicates that injustice eventually demands adjudication, in some form or another.
A different version of this post is due to appear on the LSE’s Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment blog