The key words in the recent White Paper,Legislating for the United Kingdom’s Withdrawal from the European Union, are ‘certainty’ and ‘clarity’ in the interests of a ‘smooth and orderly Brexit’, repeated in the forewords and the text. To that end, the envisaged Great Repeal Bill (GRB) will initially convert the existing acquis of EU law into domestic law, including directly effective EU laws, such as Article 157 of the TFEU on equal pay. Also in order ‘to maximise certainty’ the meaning of EU-derived law will be determined ‘by reference to’ – note the vague words – the case law of the Court of Justice (ECJ) existing on the date of Brexit. This means, the White Paper happily explains in a user-friendly example in a shaded box, that workers’ rights will ‘continue to be available’ after Brexit, giving ‘certainty to service providers and users, as well as employees and employers’. In this way the GRB will apparently deliver on the Prime Minister’s promise in October last year that workers’ rights ‘will continue to be guaranteed in law’ post-Brexit.
Despite being thin on the detail of the GRB, so far all appears so good. But scratch the surface and things are not so simple underneath. Continue reading →
My most recent edited collection has now been published:
GS Ølykke & A Sanchez-Graells (eds), Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules (Edward Elgar, 2016). It features contributions from a gender-balanced group of 16 young political science and EU economic law scholars based in 9 different EU/EEA Member States, including a number based at top UK universities. It is the result of a two year research project generously funded by the Copenhagen Business School and the Danish Gangstedfonden.
Using an innovative interdisciplinary ‘law and political science’ methodology, the book carries out a critical assessment of the reform of the EU public procurement rules in the period 2011-2014. It does this by a detailed assessment of the initial Commission proposal for new rules, the travaux preparatoires behind it, as well as the several inter-institutional negotiation and compromise texts that resulted in the 5th generation of EU public procurement directives in 2014. Continue reading →
In the Laval case (C-341/05), the capacity for minimum wages (and other work-related benefits) to be set for posted workers by collective bargaining by trade unions in the host State was cast into doubt. Collective bargaining (and the collective action that generated such bargaining) was considered to be too unpredictable in terms of effect and outcome, creating an unjustifiable barrier for the free movement of service providers. It was only in the case of ‘social dumping’, a nebulous term of uncertain reach, that collective action aimed at conclusion of a collective agreement could be permitted in respect of a particular group of posted workers. Instead, the Court relied on Article 3(1) of the Posting of Workers Directive 96/71/EC (PWD), which envisages only the setting of minimum standards in relation to certain matters. This may be done by ‘law, regulation or administrative provision’ but also by ‘collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared universally applicable…’ in accordance with Article 3(8) insofar as they concern’ activities listed in the Annex largely pertaining to the construction industry. EU States may also take the option to give such legal effect to universally applicable collective agreements in other sectors in accordance with Article 3(10). Through this prescriptive treatment of the appropriate limits of collective bargaining, what had been seen by some as a ‘floor of rights’ in PWD came to be a ‘ceiling’. If the national measures taken in respect of protection of the rights of posted workers did not fit within the ambit of the precise terms set out in the PWD, then they were impermissible, despite the apparent scope in Article 3(7) for a more generous interpretation of the Directive ‘more favourable to workers’. Continue reading →