Since the commencement of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the end of February, different international courts and tribunals have been engaged as means to invoke international responsibility for the various violations of international law that have occurred. As is often the case in international law, however, the proceedings initiated before these tribunals reflect a very particular legal framing of the broader invasion and conduct of hostilities (I wrote on this theme a few years ago in relation to the post-2014 litigation between Ukraine and Russia). This is a consequence of the absence in international law of a single, integrated judicial system with compulsory jurisdiction. Instead, there are many different courts that, for the most part, have limited subject-matter jurisdiction. (more…)
This post is part of a short series of blog posts exploring the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine against the background rules of international law. The posts are based on presentations given at an event on the subject on 7 March that was organised by the University of Bristol Law School’s Centre for International Law. In this second blog post of the series, Dr Kathryn Allinson of the School of Law, University of Bristol, considers the possibility of invoking responsibility against Russia for their invasion of Ukraine.
Dr. Kathryn Allinson, University of Bristol Law School
In the early hours of 24 February, President Putin set out his justifications for the use of Russian military force against Ukraine. This was followed by the commencement of aerial strikes across Ukraine and the invasion by ground troops of Ukrainian territory. In this blog, I will explore the role that the international law on state responsibility (as articulated in the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA)) can play in responding to this conduct by Russia.